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At the Conjunction of Love and Money: Comment on
Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-SeekingRule Out Love?
Evidence (or Not) from Economics and Law
William W. Bratton*
Professor Nelson has it absolutely right. Maximization is a
thought construct that operates at an ideological level and is not
descriptively robust. It is not a natural imperative, even as the need to
profit certainly operates as a constraint, applying tightly or loosely
depending on the particular firm and market. Nor should we think of
the capitalist firm in terms of love "or" money. We should instead
describe it around the "and" in "love and money."
This Comment will address a question that arises in the wake of
Professor Nelson's intervention: Why did maximization come to
dominate our thinking about firms? The answer is that academic
paradigms and thinking about firms both tend to follow from the
outside political economy. Indeed, capitalism itself has to take the
outside political economy as it finds it and work with the social
settlement it is handed. It just happens that for the last thirty years or
so we have had a political economy that is particularly receptive to
the maximization mindset.
It was not always this way. The present paradigm displaced a
predecessor borne of the Great Depression, a period in our history
that pushed us into the arms of a protective, regulatory state. The
accompanying mindset, which endured for decades, took us to the
other side of the love and money divide. Now, if it does not sound
quite right to describe the New Deal regulatory state as "loving,"
perhaps a modification of the operative statement of opposing
ideological positions can be accepted-instead of love and money,
we can oppose cooperation and competition, and stability and
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maximization. Whatever the characterization, a look back at the New
Deal regulatory state and the theories that justified it helps us to
understand the contingent character of the theories prevailing today,
and to appreciate the tie between descriptive accuracy and the use of
"and" rather than "or" as the conjunction. Drawing on some previous
work,' I will present the New Deal mindset through the lens of the
writings of Adolf Berle, one of its architects.
Berle's writing continues to be invoked as deep background for
today's shareholder primacy paradigm. But Michael Wachter and I
have shown that the invocation rests on a faulty understanding of
Berle.2 When Berle elevated the shareholder interest over the
management interest in a famous law review article published in
3
1932, his concern lay entirely with unchecked management power.
In the absence of some other, more effective check, he commended a
trust for the shareholders' benefit as a palliative. But as his
contemporaneous writings make clear, his preferred mode of
management power containment was government control.4 He got
that one year later during the New Deal's first hundred days. He
would never again put forward the shareholder interest as a
countervailing power within corporate law. And at no time did he
advance shareholder value maximization as an appropriate corporate
purpose.
Indeed, when Berle returned to these topics a quarter century later,
he changed his diagnosis and pronounced management power
benign.5 He had two reasons: first, the big stick, post-New Deal state
was managing the economy from "an unchallenged position of higher
authority," and second, there was a "solid political consensus in
1. See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsideredat the Century s Turn, 26 J.
CORP. L. 737 (2001); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy's
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008)
[hereinafter Bratton & Wachter, Corporatist Origins]; William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, Tracking Berle 's Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation 'sLast Chapter,33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849 (2010).
2. See Bratton & Wachter, CorporatistOrigins,supra note 1, at 109-13.
3. See Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REv. 1365, 1366-67 (1932).
4. See Bratton & Wachter, CorporatistOrigins,supra note 1, at 128-30.
5. Id. at 133-34.
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support." 6 Berle depicted a regulatory state that could and did
accurately articulate the social welfare function, and then guide and
push the markets to the right result, unencumbered by the ideology of
maximization. He described a benign equipoise amongst strong
organizations, an equipoise constrained by a wider public consensus
that empowered the central government and its social welfare agenda.
The Depression was still a vivid memory, so the public wanted
stability, in particular job security; if it took regulation to get us from
here to there, fine.
Managers had to play ball. Whether they liked it or not, they were
caught between the regulatory state and the public consensus. Failure
to satisfy the public meant new regulation; avoidance of new
regulation meant satisfying the public. So, as a practical matter,
managers had to be public-regarding. Indeed, Berle described them as
quasi-civil servants.8 Meanwhile, the shareholders just did not matter.
They were passive collectors of dividends with no productive role to
play in the political economy. In fact, capital market constraints had
ceased to matter more generally. Corporations got new equity capital
by retaining earnings and only rarely went to Wall Street to sell
stock. The markets served only to provide liquidity to the rich; there
was no disciplinary value added. 9
Berle's writing thus lets us trace our evolution from the market
driven political economy of the early twentieth century to a quasicorporatist state that privileged stability over maximization and
sought an alignment of profit and public responsiveness.
Significantly, the corporate law of Berle's time easily accommodated
a quasi-civil service role for managers. It could do so again today
without any need for adjustment. Corporate law does not require
profit maximization now any more than it did then.
In fact, corporate law could not successfully require maximization
even if a corporate lawmaker ready to wield a maximization mandate
suddenly appeared. Maximization can only be modeled. In the real
world of going concerns no one really knows if wealth is being
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

134.
136-40.
140-41.
142-43.
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maximized.' 0 It follows that corporate law can only facilitate,
clearing the field so that firms can attempt to maximize the value they
produce (assuming an intensely competitive environment) or
otherwise prosper in the absence of intense competition. Adherence
to this facilitative mission keeps corporate law relatively unburdened
by any ideology, at least apart from its basic commitment to
capitalism. It offers a framework capacious enough to accommodate
different political economies and social settlements. The framework,
with its business judgment envelope, holds out room for cooperation
with the state and redistribution on the one hand and room for
leveraged buyouts and plant closings on the other.
Meanwhile, corporate legal theories shift along with political
economies, coloring in the capacious legal framework in accordance
with the theorists' presuppositions.
To get a sense of today's colors, let us hypothesize how a
maximizer would respond to the foregoing description of the
corporate law framework. The description, one would hear, misses
the point. To ask whether corporate law can be structured
affirmatively to effect maximization puts the wrong question. Indeed,
a maximizer happily would agree that corporations, left to their own
institutional devices, will never push toward maximization. Such are
the effects of agency costs. And that is where markets come in.
Maximizers look at corporate law's capacious framework and see it
constituting hierarchies that get in the way of the markets that should
be left free to do the maximizing. And even if real world markets do
not maximize perfectly, as they do in theoretical models, at least they
do what they do spontaneously, free of the heavy hand of hierarchical
direction.
For today's corporate law maximizers, the crucial moment in the
history of post-war economic theory is Jensen and Meckling's
introduction of agency theory in 1976.11 Neoclassical economists like
Alfred Marshall assumed that firms maximized, but offered no
10. See William W. Bratton, An Anatomy of CorporateLegal Theory, 24 RES. L. & ECON.
21, 23 (2009).
11. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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microeconomic theory of the firm.' 2 Hierarchical organization was
thought to be intrinsically unsuited to such an exercise.13 Jensen and
Meckling's agency theory1 4 opened the door to a microeconomic,
market-driven picture of the corporation's internal workings-a
whole new world for maximizing. And crucially, it did so at a time
when beliefs were shifting away from the Berlian political economy
where regulation moderated competitive forces to one where
competitive forces played an increasingly unregulated role. Stability
lost out as the goal, replaced by competitive fitness in an
uncontrollable international framework.
Corporate legal theory, as always taking its instructions from the
outside political economy, promptly reconstituted itself to look to
deregulation and market controls. And so, from the 1980s on,
corporate law has obsessed on the same structural question: Who
should decide how the firm should be managed, the managers or the
shareholders themselves? The question poses a choice between
institutional security and a model driven by informational signals
from the financial markets. The shareholder side contends that
prevailing legal and institutional structures fail to provide a platform
conducive to aggressive entrepreneurship, instead inviting
management self-dealing and conservative decision making biased
toward institutional stability.15 It looks to actors in financial markets
for corrective inputs. Unlike the managers, who are conflicted and
risk averse, the shareholders, who look to the market price and
nothing else, come to the table with a pure financial incentive to
maximize value.16 So the maximizers will readily agree that many
firms survive indefinitely when making decisions that are not in their
shareholders' best interests. They just want to put a stop to it.
I do not think the market control agenda makes sense as a policy
proposition." But for present purposes, the point is that maximization
12. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History,41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1495-96 (1989).
13. Id. at 1496.
14. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 305-06.
15. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empoiverment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653, 666 (2010).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 688-716.
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is a direction to which some people point, rather than a goal that
firms must meet. They suggest that institutions can be structured so
as to move us in that direction with markets as the means to the end.
If you want market control, then a stripped-down model of the
subject works well.
Indeed, it works all too well, a point aptly stated by Professor
Nelson:
What this Article does seek to discredit is the belief that there
is something intrinsic in the economic or legal structure of
commerce that forces firms, inexorably, as if run on rails, to
neglect values of care and concern in order to strive for every
last dollar of profits. This widespread belief detracts from
human or ecological welfare, for two reasons. First, it lets
shareholders, directors, and managers of corporations morally
"off the hook" for the social and environmental consequences
of business decisions. Second, it places the entire burden of
maintaining the moral order onto non-business entities, such as
government, nonprofits, and families.18
To see widespread adherence to the automaton model of the firm
that Professor Nelson describes, along with an array of pernicious
effects, just take a look at our present financial crisis. There is a
prominent line of analysis that absolves the banks that caused the
crisis (and the human actors in charge of them) from responsibility
for their own externalities, depicting them as capitalists competing as
usual. 19 From there, in a strange twist, blame befalls those who
regulated, failed to regulate, or deregulated the companies that did the
deeds.20 All responsibilities for shortcomings in the moral order are
ascribed to the government, while the companies themselves dodge
the bullet. For further examples, all the reader has to do is open a
newspaper.
18. Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (or Not) from
Economics and Law, 35 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y 69, 71-72 (2011).
19.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 77-79 (2010)

(providing an explanation for why banks took the risks leading to the financial crisis in light of
the externalities that led to the market collapse).
20. Id. at 79.
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I used to dismiss the amoral automaton firm as something that
appealed only to ideologues at the fringe, and then only normatively.
The financial crisis has shown this assumption to be naive. When the
crisis first hit, I was sure that it amounted to enough of a shock to
alter the habits of mind Professor Nelson describes. But I was wrong
about that too.

